5:08 p.m.
We are pleased to announce that on *Monday 20 March at 18:00 (CET)*, *Anne
Meylan *(UZH) will give the talk *Inquiry and the diachronic reasons to
believe* as part of the Lugano Philosophy Colloquia.
This hybrid talk will take place in Room A31 Red Building (USI West Campus)
and online via Zoom. If you are interested in joining it online, please
write to amm.map(a)usi.ch
Here is the abstract of the talk:
*The formation of beliefs/doubts/disbeliefs, etc. is governed by two
central norms. On the one hand, there are norms that concern these
cognitive attitudes immediately. An example of this is: believe that p only
if you have sufficient reason to believe that p. On the other hand, there
are norms that rather concern the investigation or, more generally, the way
in which these cognitive attitudes should be acquired. For example, don't
investigate about p if you know that p. Or to take a much-discussed example
(Friedman 2020, 503): if one wants to figure out Q, then one ought to take
the necessary means to figuring out Q. One of the questions that seriously
troubles epistemologists is how to account for the relationship that the
former "classical epistemic norms" hold with the latter “inquiry norms”,
also called "zetetic norms".*
*In this article I would like to show that these two kinds of norms are
not, contrary to what Friedman (2022) thinks, incompatible, that is, that
they do not give rise to contradictory injunctions. It is simply that the
epistemic norm is a synchronic norm, whereas the zetetic norms are
diachronic. If this is true, there is no longer any reason to worry about
their cohabitation.*
*This will lead me to tell you quite a bit about what diachronic reasons
are in relation to synchronic reasons and about reasons to believe at all.*
For more information: https://www.usi.ch/en/feeds/24091
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